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Abstract: In a model with imperfect money, credit and reserve markets, we examine if an 
inflation-targeting central bank using the funds rate operating procedure to indirectly control 
market interest rates also needs a monetary aggregate as policy instrument. We show that if 
private agents use information extracted from money and financial markets to form inflation 
expectations and if the access to liquidity is subject to non-price rationing, the central bank 
can use a narrow monetary aggregate and the discount interest rate as independent policy 
instruments to reinforce the credibility of its announcements and the role of inflation target as 
nominal anchor for inflation expectations. This study shows how a monetary policy strategy 
combining inflation targeting and monetary targeting can be conceived to guarantee 
macroeconomic stability and the credibility of monetary policy. Friedman’s k-percent money 
growth rule, generating dynamic instability, and two alternative stabilizing feedback 
monetary targeting rules are examined. 
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Introduction 
 
Over the last decade, more and more central banks have adopted a new framework for 
conducting monetary policy known as inflation targeting, which is presented by Mishkin 
(1999) as a successor to and more efficient in controlling inflation than monetary targeting. In 
this context, the two-pillar monetary policy strategy of the ECB, announced in the autumn of 
1998, appears quite singular and quickly becomes controversial.  
Political considerations, i.e. the need to demonstrate continuity with the policies of the 
Bundesbank, have apparently dictated that the ECB pays attention to monetary aggregates as 
well in its two-pillar monetary policy strategy. In practice, the Bundesbank was a monetary 
targeter as well as an inflation targeter.1 For some researchers, the Bundesbank’s success can 
be explained by the fact that its monetary targeting is quite similar to inflation targeting as it 
announced inflation target and transparently communicated to the public and market 
participants.2 In doing so, its monetary policy is closer in practice to inflation targeting than it 
is to Friedman-like monetary targeting and thus might best be thought of as “hybrid” inflation 
targeting. Therefore, many observers have interpreted the ECB’s two-pillar strategy as a 
bridge between the monetary targeting strategy of the old Bundesbank and the more up-to-date 
inflation targeting approach (Bernanke et al., 1999; Svensson, 2000; Rudebusch and Svensson, 
2002; Mayer, 2006). In effect, the “economic pillar” resembles an implicit form of inflation 
targeting and the “monetary pillar” a weak type of monetary targeting. However, according to 
Assenmacher-Wesche and Gerlach (2007), this is a “misinterpretation” which has lead to the 
criticism of the framework for being inconsistent and lacking clarity.  
                                                           
1 Gerberding et al. (2005) find that the Bundesbank took its monetary targets seriously, but also responded to 
deviations of expected inflation and output growth from target. 
2 See, e.g., Clarida and Gertler (1996), Bernanke and Mishkin (1997), Bernanke and Mihov (1997), Laubach and 
Posen (1997), and Clarida et al. (1998).   2
The disagreement among economists about the true nature of the two-pillar strategy is 
arguably due to the fact that the ECB provides neither an explicit representation of the 
inflation process nor an explanation for why it necessitates a two-pillar framework. In effect, it 
lacks a theory justifying the simultaneous use of monetary targeting and inflation targeting.  
While monetary targeting has a clear theoretical foundation and some successful 
experiences, the two-pillar monetary strategy lacks solid theoretical foundations and is at odd 
with the current consensus about the best monetary policy strategy, i.e. inflation targeting. 
According to this consensus, if the central bank controls the nominal interest rate, inflation 
expectations are independent of monetary aggregates. Furthermore, the duality problem in a 
simple New-Keynesian or traditional IS-LM model implies that we can either control money 
supply or nominal interest rate but not two of them at the same time.  
Most of recent studies have suggested the rejection of onetary targeting on the basis that it 
is less efficient than inflation targeting (e.g., Rudebusch and Svensson, 2002; Evans and 
Honkapohja, 2003; Woodford, 2008) or that the instability of the relationship between 
monetary aggregates and goal variables implies too many conditions for its success (Mishkin, 
1999) and larger control problems (Cabos et al., 2003). However, when this relationship is 
unstable, a central bank with high credibility can successfully stabilize inflation and output 
through monetary targeting if it is flexible, transparent and accountable (Mishkin, 2002). 
Several authors provide empirical models with two-pillar Phillips curve which justifies the 
two-pillar strategy (e.g. Gerlach, 2004; Assenmacher-Wesche and Gerlach, 2007) by testing 
the hypothesis that inflation can be decomposed into a ‘trend’, which is explained by a 
smoothed measure of past money growth, and a deviation from that trend, which is accounted 
for by the output gap. Based on Ireland (2004), Barthélemy et al. (2008) have developed a 
DSGE monetary policy model for the Euro Area in which both the IS and Phillips curves 
depend on real balances. They have found a significant role for money in the Euro Area. These   3
studies imply that the optimal interest rate rule depends on money growth. Hence, inflation 
expectations are related to monetary aggregates even if only information extracted from the 
optimal inflation targeting rule, Phillips curve and IS curve is used to form them. 
Other arguments in favour of an ECB-style two-pillar strategy does not require direct 
effects of money on output or inflation. Bordes and Clerc (2007) justify the need to announce 
a monetary growth target (reference value) by arguing that the central bank can influence the 
real interest rate through the liquidity effect in the short term but not in the medium to long 
term. Therefore, in order to reduce long-term price level uncertainty and to ensure the 
consistency between short-term and long-term inflation expectations, its only means of action 
to influence inflation expectations is through the announcement of a money growth target. 
Beck and Wieland (2007) have shown that, in the event of persistent policy misperceptions 
regarding potential output, the ECB-style cross-checking and changing interest rates in 
response to sustained deviations of long-run money growth can have some stabilisation 
properties. Woodford (2008) also argues that, to the extent that money growth is useful as an 
indicator variable, there is no a priori reason to exclude monetary variables from the set of 
indicators that are taken into account by the central bank.  
The recent financial crisis of 2007-09 has lead De Grauwe and Gros (2009) to contest the 
consensus according to which the price stability is a strategy that will minimise the risk of 
financial instability and the main responsibility for maintaining financial stability is in the 
hands of the supervisors and regulators.3 Considering that there is a trade-off between price 
stability and financial stability, they suggest that the ECB would continue to use the interest 
rate to achieve its inflation target while using reserve requirements and macro-prudential 
                                                           
3 They agree with the emerging consensus that price stability does not guarantee financial stability and is, in fact, 
often associated with excess credit growth and emerging asset bubbles (see, e.g., M. King, 2009; Shirakawa, 
2009).     4
controls to maintain financial stability. Thus, the ECB would have an instrument to prevent 
asset bubbles from getting out of hand, which should stabilise inflation expectations. 
The above studies relative to the two-pillar monetary policy strategy neglect one important 
assumption which justifies the opposition between monetary targeting and inflation targeting. 
In effect, under the assumption that all financial assets are perfect substitutes and hence 
interest rates on money and credit markets are perfectly controlled by the central bank, these 
two strategies become substitutable. By recommending the control of nominal interest rate, 
economists advocate that the supply of money is automatically determined by the demand 
(Woodford, 1998; Rudebusch and Svensson, 1999). It implies that the monetary authority 
implicitly confers to the private sector the following message: any quantity of money that you 
wish at given nominal interest rate will be provided. In a reduced macro-economic model 
(New-Keynesian or traditional IS-LM model) which simplifies at maximum the functioning of 
money and financial markets, the strategy of inflation targeting is efficient and allows 
anchoring inflation expectations when the central bank is perfectly credible and transparent. 
However, one can question whether, in practice, financial institutions and other private agents 
have an unconstrained access to the central liquidity and whether they doubt about the 
inflation expectations anchoring when the central bank is not perfectly credible and 
transparent.  
It is to notice that, since the end of 1980s, most central banks (including inflation-
targeting central banks) target only indirectly market interest rates through a funds rate 
targeting procedure (Walsh, 2003). Under such an operating procedure, the central bank, by 
setting the discount interest rate, conducts open-market operations to target the funds rate, a 
very short interest rate on the interbank market. The literature on the inflation targeting and 
interest rate rules greatly simplifies the theoretical models by not distinguishing these interest   5
rates with other market interest rates (e.g., longer term interbank interest rate, medium and 
long term lending rates), which directly affect private consumption and investment.  
 As Romer (2000) has remarked, one area in which both the traditional IS-LM approach 
(where the money is considered as a monetary policy instrument) and IS-MP approach (where 
MP stands for monetary policy, i.e. interest rate rule or inflation targeting) may have 
simplified too far in their treatment of financial markets. In both approaches, the only feature 
of financial markets that matters for the demand for goods is ‘the’ real interest rate that 
monetary policy can powerfully and directly influence as the central bank desires. In practice, 
the demand for goods depends on interest rates that the central bank may not be able to control 
directly as well as the level of credit which is available at those rates. An analysis, which more 
carefully takes account of the impacts of various developments in financial markets on the 
demand for goods as well as the mechanism through which the monetary policy affects these 
interest rates and the level of credit, would highlight many of the difficulties and uncertainties 
of actual policy-making. For B. Friedman (2003), abandoning the role of money and the 
analytics of the LM curve makes it less easy to explain how the functioning of the banking 
system (and with it the credit markets more generally) matters for monetary policy and also 
leaves open the underlying question of how the central bank manages to fix the chosen interest 
rate in the first place. These concerns find some echoes in Goodhart (2007) who argues that 
the central banks must still pay attention to the monetary aggregates, in particular the growth 
rate of the bank credit allocated to the private sector. Moreover, Christiano et al. (2007) show 
that a monetary policy which concentrates too narrowly on inflation can, in an unintended 
way, contribute to reduce the welfare via cycles of expansion and depression in the real and 
financial variables. More recently, Walsh (2009) observes that distortions in financial markets 
and financial shocks that generate real effects of monetary policy also imply that financial 
stability may require making trade-offs between inflation stabilization and output stabilisation.   6
This paper examines how the monetary policy strategy of a central bank that, under a funds 
rate targeting procedure, indirectly controls market interest rates through setting the discount 
interest rate and conducting open-market operations, will be affected by the alternative 
assumptions about the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. More precisely, we 
assume that money, credit and reserve markets are imperfect and private agents also use 
information extracted from equilibrium conditions on these markets in forming their inflation 
expectations. Under these assumptions, inflation expectations depend on the money growth 
rate. Thus, manipulating the money supply, while setting the discount rate, could be a sensible 
monetary policy strategy. The principal aim of this study is to show how to combine inflation 
targeting and monetary targeting in order to anchor inflation expectations and to ensure the 
dynamic stability of the economy when the impacts of monetary and financial factors on 
monetary policy strategy are taken into account.  
In practice, the central liquidity is not accessible at unlimited quantity because central 
banks limit the quantity, quality and types of assets accepted as collateral as well as the types 
of financial institutions which have direct access to this liquidity, i.e. there is non-price 
rationing. This implies that there could be a potential imbalance (excess of liquidity or crisis of 
illiquidity) on the money market. Thus, setting the discount rate under the funds rate operating 
procedure does not allow a strict control of interest rates on money and credit markets as 
shown by their dramatic rise in the wake of the bankruptcy of Lehman’s Brothers in the fall of 
2008.  
Central bank’s interventions through injection or withdrawal of liquidity become essential 
for bringing market interest rates to a level near the discount rate, which normally anchors the 
expected market interest rates but has not the power of controlling their actual levels. The 
control of money supply also has the advantage of being more flexible than that of the 
discount rate because the latter must generally follow a well defined trend and is not   7
modifiable within long intervals separating two interest policy decisions except in the event of 
financial crisis.  
In effect, the hypothesis of imperfect money and financial markets offers a better 
understanding of the functioning of the economy and how a monetary policy is implemented. 
In effect, the target of credit market’s interest rate (determined by the central bank and 
formulated in terms of optimal interest rate rule under the inflation-targeting regime), which 
directly affects the decision of consumption and investment, cannot be directly set and is not 
always realized due to the malfunctioning of money and financial markets or shocks affecting 
these markets. More precisely, the central bank sets the discount rate, which is determined by 
taking account of inflation and output targets as well as the complete economic model 
(including money and financial markets). A modification of the discount rate allows inducing 
a change in the money market interest rate, affecting then the interest rate determined on the 
credit market at which firms and consumers can borrow. If this transmission mechanism is 
perturbed by exogenous shocks or endogenous instability, adopting monetary targeting under 
inflation-targeting regime through the design of appropriate interest rate rule and money 
growth rule could have many advantages in terms of monitoring inflation expectations, 
controlling money and credit market interest rates, and ensuring the dynamic stability of the 
economy.  
The failure of the transmission mechanism, which links the discount rate to other interest 
rates as well as the zero bound on the nominal interest rate, could greatly limit the possibility 
of actions for inflation-targeting central banks. In severe economic and financial crises, a 
central bank too aggressive in reducing the discount rate can quickly find itself without 
interest rate instrument and therefore the means of sufficiently reducing money and credit 
market interest rates and anchoring inflation expectations.    8
In this respect, this paper is also related to the literature on the zero bound on the nominal 
interest rate and quantitative easing policy. It is to notice that, theoretical studies about the 
zero bound on the nominal interest rate (e.g. Svensson, 2001; Benhabib et al., 2002; 
Eggertsson and Woodford, 2003; Auerbach and Obstfeld, 2005; Adam and Billi, 2007), using 
a framework similar to the one employed by the literature on inflation targeting, do not make 
explicit the links between monetary policy and extremely negative financial shocks and hence 
are not wholly satisfactory for studying the underlying transmission mechanism of the effects 
of zero-interest and quantitative-easing policies. In this respect, the present framework can be 
easily extended to take into account this kind of link and hence allows understanding why 
these policies becomes suddenly necessary under extreme financial stress.  
The hypothesis of imperfect money and financial markets also gives a better account of the 
dynamics of inflation expectations. The expected inflation rate deduced from the spread of 
return between the indexed and un-indexed bonds shows that inflation expectations are not as 
static as predicts the inflation targeting literature.4 Thus, using information extracted from 
money and financial markets could improve private sector’s inflation expectations compared 
to the case where only information extracted from the interest rate rule, the Philips curve and 
the IS curve is used as it is admitted in the literature on inflation targeting and interest rate 
rules.  
In the following, a narrow monetary aggregate and the discount interest rate are considered 
as two independent but complementary monetary policy instruments. Well used 
simultaneously, they allow preventing macroeconomic and financial instability in an uncertain 
economic environment. Their combination can be considered as a kind of two-pillar monetary 
policy strategy. However, it is not simply the reintroduction of the monetarism in the inflation-
                                                           
4 Some introductive teachings even treat the expected rate of inflation as fixed in the presence of serially non-
correlated stochastic shocks (Romer, 2000; Walsh, 2002).   9
targeting framework through the adoption of Friedman’s k-percent money growth rule. In 
effect, the design of money growth rules is crucial for the success of such strategy.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a theoretical 
model with imperfect money and financial markets. In the section after, the optimal reaction 
function of the central bank is derived by taking into account the imperfection of money and 
financial markets. The fourth section considers the reduced model and derives the dynamic 
equation for expected inflation rate. The fifth section analyzes the dynamic stability of the 
economy under Friedman’s k-percent money growth rule. The sixth section examines two 
alternative feedback monetary targeting rules. The final section summarizes the findings. 
   
1.  The Model 
The economy is characterized by a continuous time model. Equations describing inflation 
adjustment, aggregate spending and money market equilibrium are given as follows:5  
t t
e
t t y y π ) (   ε α π π + − + =
∗ ,            0 > α ,                                                                 (1) 
dt
e
t ct t i y ε π β     ) (   + − − = ,                     0     > β ,                                                                (2) 
lt mt t t t i l y l p m ε + − = − 2 1 ,                0   , 2 1 > l l ,                                                             (3)  
where  t π  ( t dt
dp p
t & ≡ ≡ ) is the current inflation rate which is the time derivative of general price 
level  t p , 
e
t π   the unconditional expected inflation rate of time t,  t y  the actual output, 
∗ y  the 
natural rate of output,  ct i  the nominal credit market interest rate at which banks lend to non-
financial private agents,  mt i  a medium-term nominal interest rate on the interbank money 
market and  t m  the money supply. The variables  y ,  m  and  p  are expressed in natural 
                                                           
5 We can also use a standard micro-founded New-Keynesian framework (Clarida et al., 1999) by integrating 
some imperfections on money and financial markets for the purpose of policy analysis.    10
logarithms.  t π ε ,  dt ε  and  lt ε  are respectively contemporary stochastic shocks affecting the 
supply and the demand of goods and the demand of money.  
Equation (1) stipulates that inflation adjustment is governed by an expectational Phillips 
curve. According to equation (2), the aggregate demand depends on expected real interest rate 
on the credit market, 
e
t ct i π − . Equation (3) represents the LM curve with a real money demand 
depending on real income and nominal money market interest rate.  
The money supply is endogenous but imperfectly elastic as the banking system will 
increase or decrease the internal money in taking account of nominal interest rate as well as 
collateral and will not always satisfy the money demand. Similarly, the central bank provides a 
limited quantity of central liquidity on the reserve market to a limited number of banks by 
accepting certain categories of assets as collateral. The link between the total money supply 
and the monetary base is modeled as follows:   
t mt t t i h b m ω + + = 1 ,     0 1 > h   .           (4) 
where  t b  is the monetary base in log terms, and money multiplier ( t t b m −  in log terms) is 
assumed to be an increasing function of nominal money market interest rate, and  t ω  is a 
money-multiplier disturbance. The modeling of money supply is similar to that of Modigliani 
et al. (1970), and McCallum and Hoehn (1983).  
The central bank is assumed to indirectly target the money and credit market interest rates 
through the funds rate targeting procedure. Under such an operating procedure, the central 
bank does not directly target  ct i or  mt i , longer term interest rates, but the funds rate ( ft i ), a very 
short-run or overnight interest rate. In effect, the central bank controls the discount rate,  dt i , 
and conducts open market operations to affect the supply of reserves in the banking system to 
target the funds rate. It is assumed that there is non-price rationing of access to the central   11
liquidity at the discount window, so that  dt ft i i ≠ .6 Similarly, it is assumed there is non-price 
rationing of access to inside liquidity created within the banking and financial system so that 
we generally have  dt ft mt i i i ≠ ≠ .  
Under the funds rate targeting procedure, using a simplified description of the reserve 
market to establish the link between the monetary base  t b and the discount rate  dt i , the money 
supply can be rewritten as (Appendix A) 
mt dt mt t t i h i h b m ε + − + = 2 1 ,     0 , 2 1 > h h ,         (5) 
where  t b  represents the currency in log terms but could also include the component of the 
reserves that the central bank can discretionarily control by adjusting the ratio of obligatory 
reserves, and  mt ε  represents shocks affecting the monetary base under the funds rate targeting 
procedure as well as these affecting the monetary multiplier. According to equation (5), the 
central bank, by controlling the discount rate, has not a strict control over the money supply 
since the latter is affected by the money market interest rate and a random shock. However, in 
order to modify the behaviors of private agents and their inflation expectations, control can be 
exercised by the central bank over  t b , a component of monetary base which do not depend on 
the discount rate. The equilibrium condition on the money market (3) is rewritten as 
lt mt t t mt dt mt t i l y l p i h i h b ε ε + − = − + − + 2 1 2 1 ,   (6) 
In the following, we assume that  0 2 2 1 > + − l h h . This is justified on the ground that the supply 
of liquidity by the banking sector is more likely determined by the difference ( dt mt i i − ), i.e. the 
net gain obtained from providing more liquidity while refinancing it at the discount rate. Thus, 
                                                           
6 If there were no nonprice rationing at the discount window, the funds rate would never rise above the discount 
rate, because a bank would never pay more for reserves than it would have to pay at the discount window 
(Goodfriend, 1983).   12
an increase of equal amount in  dt i  and  mt i  will not (or modestly) affect the money supply but 
will significantly reduce the money demand, ceteris paribus.  
The model is completed by a credit market equilibrium condition in the spirit of Bernanke 
and Blinder (1988): 
ct ct t ct mt i j y j i f i f ε + − = + − 2 1 2 1 ,           with  0 , , , 2 1 2 1 > j j f f ,         (7) 
where  ct ε  denotes a random shock that incorporates both credit supply and credit demand 
shocks. We admit that  0 2 2 1 < − − j f f , i.e. an increase of identical amount in  mt i  and  ct i  will 
leave the credit supply stable or decreasing less (as the lending margin in absolute terms is 
unchanged and only the margin in relative terms is reduced) than the credit demand. Some 
modifications relative to the model of Bernanke and Blinder have been introduced. Public 
bonds are not included in this model since its rate of return could stay relatively stable in the 
event of important financial shocks affecting private sectors. The private bonds are assumed to 
be a perfect substitute to bank lending. Instead of long term bonds, the rate of interest  mt i  is 
assumed to affect both the demand and supply of liquidity on the money market. For 
simplicity, we further assume that  mt i  does not affect consumption and investment decisions. 
Despite these simplifications, by giving a special attention to money and credit markets, we 
can quite realistically examine how the central bank’s interest rate policy makes its way into 
the economy and how inflation expectations adjust.  
Since financial assets are imperfect substitutes, their respective interest rates are related by 
the following no-arbitrage conditions at equilibrium:  
ct mt ct i i ρ + = ,                          (8) 
mt dt mt i i ρ + = .            ( 9 )    13
where  ct ρ  is the sum of the mark-up and a risk premium over money market interest rate 
applied by banks to the commercial lending,  mt ρ  is a risk premium over the discount rate 
applied to the interbank lending.  
When the central bank controls  dt i , it must recursively determine the target of  dt i  using 
equations (6)-(7) or (8)-(9) once the target of credit market interest rate is known. Thus, given 
that the money market equilibrium condition (6) determines the value for  dt i  to attain the 
targets of other interest rates, it follows that the money supply cannot be endogenously 
determined using the same condition as it is usually assumed in the inflation targeting 
literature (Woodford, 1998, Clarida et al., 1999; King, 2000).  
The way to close the model generally adopted in the inflation-targeting literature is to 
assume that the money supply automatically adjusts to the money demand so that the money 
market can be ignored without serious consequences. In this model, by assuming that market 
interest rates and discount rate are distinct, the central bank will not be able to control the 
market interest rates without manipulating the money supply. In other words, the money 
supply is partially endogenous but does not automatically adjust to satisfy the money demand 
except when the central bank maintains  mt ρ  at a fixed level.  
The central bank acts to minimize fluctuations of output around the natural rate and 
inflation around its target under discretion. More precisely, the central bank is assumed to 
minimize the following loss function measured in terms of present discounted value: 
[] dt t y y L
T




2 2 θ π π κ λ − − + − =∫
∞
∗ ,      0   ,   , > θ κ λ ,   (10) 
where parameters λ  and κ  denote the weight that the central bank assigns to output and 
inflation stabilization respectively, and θ  is the discount factor. The strategy of flexible   14
inflation targeting is implemented through an optimal nominal interest rate rule, which is 
deduced from the optimal inflation targeting rule of the central bank. 
The time sequence of events is as follows: 1) Workers form their inflation expectations and 
negotiate current wages taking account of information about the economy, including that 
extracted from observing the money and financial markets. 2) Shocks realize. 3) The central 
bank sets the discount rate following an optimal interest rate rule as well as the money growth 
rate. 4) Firms decide their production and prices.  
 
3. The optimal interest rate rules 
 
The optimal inflation targeting rule is the solution to the sequence of single period decision 
problems of the central bank under discretion. Because the decisions of the central bank at 
time t do not bind it at any future dates, the central bank is unable to affect the private sector’s 
expectations about future inflation. Thus, for given inflation expectations, the decision 
problem of the central bank becomes the problem of minimizing the single-period loss 
function in (10) subject to the inflation adjustment equation (1). Thus, the first-order condition 
for this problem is: 
) (
T




∗ ,       (11) 
that, with equation (2), leads to the following optimal credit market interest rate rule: 












π + − − + =
∗ .           ( 1 2 )    
where 
T
ct i  represents the target of credit market interest rate at t, which must be attained in 
order to minimize the central bank’s loss function.  
According to equation (12), it is optimal for the central bank to adjust the target of nominal 
credit market interest rate upward to reflect the expected inflation rate (to a full extent), the   15
gap between current inflation and the inflation target, a decrease in the natural rate of output as 
well as positive demand shocks.  
Definition: An inflation targeting regime is a monetary strategy under which the central bank 
directly sets the short-run interest rate so that the target of credit market interest rate defined 
by the rule (12) is realized without being altered by the imperfections and shocks affecting the 
money and financial markets.   
To attain the target of credit market interest rate, the central bank controls only directly the 
discount rate, which indirectly affects the credit market interest rate via the money market 
interest rate. The latter’s target, 
T
mt i , is related to 
T
ct i  through equation (7). Using equations (7) 
and (11)-(12), it follows: 
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According to equations (12) and (13), 
T
mt i   reacts more strongly, compared to 
T
ct i , to the 





f j , and it reacts more strongly to the gap 
between the inflation rate and the inflation target and the natural rate of output if  1
1
2 2 1 >
+ +
f
f j j β , 
and vice versa.  
Proposition 1.  To implement the inflation-targeting regime, the target of money market 
interest rate must be adjusted to neutralize the effects of credit demand and supply shocks on 
the credit market interest rate.  
Proof. It follows directly from comparing equations (12) and (13).  ■    
The discount rate must be set such that the target of money market interest rate is attained. 
Setting 
T
mt mt i i =  and using equations (6), (11) and (13) yield   16
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Equation (14) gives the optimal rule of discount rate. The target of the latter reacts to the 
expected inflation rate, the gap between current inflation and the inflation target, the natural 
rate of output and demand shocks similarly to the target of credit market interest rate except 
that the coefficients of reaction must also take account the imperfect transmission mechanism 
of monetary policy through the monetary and financial markets and shocks affecting the latter. 
Comparing with 
T
ct i , the reactions of 
T
dt i  to the expected inflation rate and demand shocks are 
amplified if  1
1 2
2 2 2 1 ) )( ( >
+ +
f h
j f l h , and its reactions to the gap between the inflation rate and the 
inflation target and the natural rate of output are amplified if  1
2 1
1 1 2 1 2 2 1 ) )( ( >
+ + + +
h f
l f j j f l h β β , and vice 
versa.  
Proposition 2. To implement the inflation targeting regime, the target of the discount rate is 
adjusted to neutralize the effects of money demand and supply shocks and a variation in real 
currency ( t t p b − ) on the targets of money and credit market interest rates.7  
Proof. It follows directly from the comparison of equations (12), (13) and (14).  ■ 
Assume that the central bank implements the rule (14) and is not subject to the lower 
bound on the nominal interest rate so that the targets rates defined by (12), (13) and (14) are all 
realized, i.e. 
T
ct ct i i = , 
T
mt mt i i =  and 
T
dt dt i i = . Using equations (8)-(9) and (12)-(14), risk 
premiums are calculated as: 
                                                           
7 It is to notice the term ‘real currency’ is used for simplicity. In effect, as we have defined before,  t t p b −  could 
also include a component which depends on the obligatory ratio set by the central bank.    17
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In the absence of zero bound on the nominal interest rate, the risk premium between the 
credit market interest rate and the money market interest rate decreases with the expected 
inflation rate, the gap between the inflation rate and the inflation target and a positive 
aggregate demand shock, and it increases with the natural rate of output since  0 2 2 1 < − − j f f . 
It increases with a positive (negative) credit demand (supply) shock.  
Given that  0 2 2 1 > + − l h h , the risk premium between the money market interest rate and 
the discount rate decreases with the expected inflation, the gap between the inflation rate and 
the inflation target and a positive aggregate demand shock, and increases with the natural rate 
of output and a positive credit demand shock. It decreases with  t b  (the exogenous component 
of monetary base) and the money supply shock, and increases with the price level and the 
money demand shock. If we assume that the average values of the determinants of  mt ρ  are all 
constant (with ( t t p b − ) being considered as one term), then  mt ρ  can be assumed to follow a 
stochastic process with constant average and it is directly observed by market participants.8 
If the central bank does not try to control the instantaneous risk premium between money 
market and discount rates at a strictly fixed level, it is not necessary to have the money supply 
totally endogenous. Observing the money market risk premium, the market participants can 
extract information useful for determining the expected inflation rate. If the central bank 
desires to influence inflation expectations, control can be exercised over a narrow monetary   18
aggregate such as  t b , and variations in this aggregate are then associated with variations in 
broader measures of money supply. Due to imperfection of the transmission mechanism of 
interest rate policy, the money supply becomes an independent instrument and the money 
market is not anymore redundant. 
In normal situations, the central bank can attain the target of other interest rates by setting 
the discount rate, even though disturbances in financial and corporate sectors can create 
dislocation on financial markets and enlarge the difference between the discount rate and other 
interest rates. However, absorbing extreme negative disturbances in goods market may require 
a low target of credit market interest rate which may not be within the reach of the central 
bank due to simultaneous negative monetary and financial disturbances and the zero bound on 
the nominal discount rate. In this case, non-orthodox monetary policy, such as the quantitative 
easing policy, must be used to ease the tension on the money market or more audaciously the 
credit market through strengthening banks’ balance sheet and/or buying private debts on the 
credit market by the central bank or Treasury.  
Consequently, in the process of implementing the interest rate policy, the control of 
monetary aggregate may be very helpful particularly when the money and financial markets 
are perturbed and attaining the target of credit market interest rate may need excessively ample 
movements of the discount rate or even a negative discount rate. In the following, it is 
assumed that the central bank will always be able to attain the target of credit market interest 
rate by varying the discount rate within the range  0 ≥ dt i . In the case of liquidity trap, i.e. the 
credit market interest rate is higher than its target level for  0 = dt i ,  the central bank will 
practice a quantitative easing policy. More precisely, it will either discretionarily expand the 
money supply through an increase in  t b , or buy assets on money and credit markets to reduce 
                                                                                                                                                                                       
8 In the case where some terms, such as 
∗ y , are not stationary, an appropriate answer of the real balances to the   19
ct ρ  and  mt ρ  in a way that 
T
ct i  is attained. 
 
4. The dynamics of expected inflation 
 
As the expected inflation rate is determined before current inflation rate and output, its 
dynamic trajectory can be studied in a reduced dynamic system where  t π  and  t y  are 
substituted by their solution in terms of expected inflation, exogenous variables and shocks. 
Once the dynamic trajectory of 
e
t π  is solved, one can determine these of   t π  and  t y . 
Assuming that the zero-bound on the nominal interest rate (if it exists) is avoided by 
quantitative easing policy and that the discount rate defined in (14) is implemented so that the 
credit market interest rate is equal to the target level defined by equation (12), equations (1)-
(2) and (12) enable us to solve inflation rate and output as function of expected inflation rate 
and inflation shock: 
t
T e
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∗ .                                               (18) 
Equations (17) and (18) are not final solutions for inflation rate and output gap respectively, 
which can only be obtained after having solved expected inflation rate. They show that, 
departing from an initial equilibrium where 
T e
t π π = , an increase in inflation expectations will 
positively impact current inflation and negatively current output.  
The determination of inflation expectations in the inflation targeting literature only takes 
account of the information about the targeting rule, IS and Phillips curves, while the expected 
money growth rate as well as money and financial shocks (when they are persistent) have no 
                                                                                                                                                                                       
trend of these terms could restore the random property for  mt ρ .    20
impact on private inflation expectations. If shocks are always i.i.d., it follows from computing 
the mathematical expectations of equation (17) that 
T e π π = . The latter means that private 
agents will believe in the announced inflation target 
T π  and the model becomes static. This is 
misleading for the central bank as well as for private agents when shocks are not perceived as 
random and transitory. For this reason, the revision of rational inflation expectations by market 
participants using more information is necessary. Since money and financial markets convey 
all information about the economy, it can serve as the co-ordination device for private agents 
in the formation of inflation expectations (Dai and Sidiropoulos, 2003). Private agents will use 
a whole set of information provided by money and financial markets to revise as fine as 
possible their expectations. Furthermore, the inclusion of monetary targeting in the monetary 
policy strategy implies that the money would have an important impact on the determination 
of the current price level and inflation, and thus future inflation. 
In modern economies with developed financial markets, sophisticated financial 
instruments (such as inflation-indexed bonds, interest rate options, swaps and futures) are 
traded and implicitly convey market expectations about future inflation. In this simple model, 
in the absence of these complex financial instruments, private agents are assumed to directly 
learn from the information conveyed by the money market which is connected to other 
financial and real markets to determine the expected inflation rate underlying the movements 





t b & = μ , i.e. the expected growth rate of the exogenous component of monetary 
base (called money growth rate thereafter for simplicity). Equations (16) and (17)-(18) allow 
deriving, for  0 =
T π & , the differential equation for expected inflation rate (Appendix B):  
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e
t Σ   captures the expectations (or 
beliefs) about the persistence of different shocks. If all shocks are expected to be serially 
uncorrelated, it follows that  0 = Σ
e
t .  
Equation (19) implies that the rate of change of the expected inflation rate is determined by 
the difference between the expected inflation rate and the expected money growth rate, the 
expected rate of change of the natural rate of output as well as the expected persistence of 
different shocks affecting decisions of private agents in their choice of consumption, 
production and acquisition of money and financial assets. Equation (19) can be easily solved 
for 
e
t π  once   
e
t μ , 
e y
∗ &  and 
e
t Σ  are specified (Buiter, 1984). In this study, the focus is put on 
the stability property of the adjustment process of 
e
t π  and hence its solution is not given.  
If shocks are all transitory white noises (serially non-correlated shocks, i.e., 
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T e π π =  is also the steady equilibrium solution of 
equation (19) which becomes  ) (
T e e π π π − Ψ = &  for 
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Under the latter condition, at equilibrium, the economy will behave similarly to what happens 
under an inflation-targeting regime with perfect money and financial markets. However, 
equation (19) is a more realistic description of the revision mechanism of inflation 
expectations, since it also takes account of information about monetary and financial factors 
which are completely absent in equation (17), and hence the risk of instability due to them. 
Furthermore, it also allows examining the effects of market beliefs or persistent shocks (other 
than inflation shock) on inflation dynamics. 
Equation (19) shows that the link between monetary policy and expected inflation is not 
obvious. Pure inflation-targeting regimes could fail (i.e. dynamically unstable) if a change in   22
the discount rate does not induce appropriate variations in the market interest rates and money 
supply, hence leading to divergent inflation expectations. Adopting monetary aggregates as 
another policy instrument, the central bank can, through adjusting money growth (e.g. through 
adjusting the ratio of obligatory reserves or the currency) to create excess or shortage of 
liquidity, influence short-run inflation expectations in the way that they will not significantly 
deviate from the inflation target in the medium to long term.  
During the last decade, even though inflation-targeting central banks’ principal objectives 
(i.e. stabilization of inflation and output gap) are relatively well achieved, too much 
disequilibrium on the financial markets has been accumulated, translating into bubbles in real 
and financial asset prices. The fact that huge asset bubbles appear more frequently could be 
due to that central banks do not pay anymore attention to the increase in the quantity of money 
and credits. However, they pay great attention to these aggregates when the financial system 
and the real economy are facing the risk of collapsing. This asymmetrical behavior with regard 
to the quantity of money and credits could be at the origin of dramatic financial shocks with 
devastating effects on the real economy. 
To avoid large self-inflicted financial shocks in the future without rejecting the recent 
important advances in the central banking such as inflation targeting which puts accent on 
central bank’s independence and transparency, one solution is to combine inflation targeting 
with monetary targeting through the design of an optimal interest rate rule and an appropriate 
money growth rule, which are compatible with the dynamic stability of the economy. 
By only setting the discount rate, in an aggressive manner or not, to indirectly affect the 
market interest rates, the central bank might have no credible instrument for anchoring 
inflation expectations besides the cheap talk about its firm intention to attain its inflation 
target. The real challenge appears whenever the economy is outside of equilibrium. When the 
inflation rate moves away from the announced target, verbal persuasion via the publication of   23
the minutes, the monthly reports, the data, the procedures of decisions as well as the models 
used could be not enough to convince the public to adhere to the central bank’s monetary 
policy decision. Temporary but persistent shocks could make further difficult the conduct of 
monetary policy through controlling the discount rate under the funds rate targeting procedure. 
Furthermore, rational speculative inflationary bubbles cannot be excluded in a dynamic 
framework.  
Thus, in the absence of monetary targeting rule, inflation targeting might not be perfectly 
credible.9 In effect, to entirely believe that the inflation target is equivalent for private agents 
to believe that random shocks compensate each other and hence have no consequence in terms 
of average inflation. As their time horizons are different and far from infinite and the effects of 
shocks might not be mutually compensated in their respective time horizon, private agents 
might be incited to use an alternative method to form inflation expectations. The latter, to be 
adopted, has to reflect better their personal time horizon of decision during which the current 
inflation rate could be systematically different from the expected inflation rate due to 
permanent, persistent or even stochastic shocks.10 Therefore, private agents may find rational 
to lose some precious time to collect all information about the economy to form inflation 
expectations instead of only using the Phillips curve, IS curve and central bank’s targeting 
rule, not to mention that the Phillips curve is also submitted to instability in the long-run and 
some important pitfalls. If this is the case, private agents could anticipate an inflation rate 
different from the announced inflation target. Thus, inflation targeting will not necessarily 
offer the nominal anchor for inflation expectations as assumed in the inflation-targeting 
literature.  
                                                           
9 The concept of imperfect credibility is used in the sense that private agents don’t automatically and uniquely 
use the inflation target as nominal anchor and instead, they use information extracted from money and asset 
market equilibrium conditions to revise their inflation expectations. 
10 The random nature of shocks does not exclude that the same kind of shocks occur repetitively and 
consecutively for several times.    24
The central bank desires that private agents believe in its inflation target, even in the event 
of shocks inducing the realized inflation rate to deviate from the target. Considering that 
private sector scrutinizes money and financial markets to find out the market inflation 
expectations, the central bank concerned with ensuring that its credibility is not altered 
controls the growth rate of the narrow money supply at an average level and hence influences 
the liquidity available in the monetary and financial system in a way consistent with the 
inflation target. Therefore, the central bank might be able to more effectively anchor inflation 
expectations. 
Introducing a monetary targeting rule does not mean that, to attain the inflation target, the 
central bank has to scrupulously fix the growth rate of a chosen monetary aggregate at a 
certain percentage because such aggregate could be subject to exogenous shocks or even 
disturbances due to speculative behaviors of financial operators.  
If the monetary targeting rule is well specified, the inflation target of the central bank is 
always achieved when the effects of shocks disappear since the dynamic stability is embedded 
in the economy. Therefore, even if the expected and realized inflation rates can be temporarily 
different from the inflation target, their difference will decrease over time. Otherwise, an 
exogenous change in inflation expectations could lead the economy to deviate far from the 
equilibrium corresponding to the announced inflation and output objectives. 
If the inflation target represents a nominal anchor of the economy, the control of money 
growth makes it more credible in the eyes of private agents and provides a kind of additional 
nominal anchor for inflation expectations.  
The constant money growth rule has been considered as a failure in stabilizing inflation 
and inflation expectations. It is hence interesting to examine its capability of dynamic 
stabilization in this model and then compare it with alternative feedback money growth rules.  
   25
5. The dynamic behavior of the economy under Friedman’s k-percent rule 
 
If the central bank desires a credible inflation-targeting policy, it could monitor the expected 
inflation in keeping an average long-term money growth rate consistent with its inflation target 
(
T π ). However, monetary targeting must not be considered as an independent strategy for 
achieving price stability by stabilizing inflation around a given inflation target since it faces, 
as shown by Svensson (1999), an unpleasant choice between being either inefficient and 
transparent or efficient and non-transparent.  
Time derivation of equations (3) is at the base of pure monetary targeting. It implies that, 
in order to stabilize current and expected inflation rates around a constant steady state level, 
monetary authorities are constrained to set a money growth rate consistent with the inflation 
target, adjusted for variation in the natural rate of output. One example of monetary targeting 
rule consistent with the present model is:  
∗ + + + + − + = y f
f l j j f l h h e
t &
1
1 1 2 1 2 2 2 1 ) )( (   β
β β μ μ ,     with 
T π = μ .                       (20)   
This is a variant of Friedman’s k-percent money growth rule.11 This kind of monetary targeting 
is a signal that the central bank is independent and fighting against price instability, and a 
means to define the role of monetary policymaker vis-à-vis other players in the 
macroeconomic policy game, and to structure the internal monetary policy debate (von Hagen, 
1999).  






t ΨΣ + − Ψ = )   ( μ π π & ,          ( 2 1 )  
                                                           
11 This is consistent with the practice of Bundesbank. Each year, Bundesbank sets its money-growth target equal 
to the sum of an inflation target, a forecast of the growth of potential output, and an estimated trend in velocity 
(Svensson, 1999).   26
As in Buiter and Panigirtzoglou (2003), the inflation rate and hence the expected inflation 
rate are treated as predetermined. In effect, it is quite reasonable to admit that 
e π  is a 
predetermined variable in a low inflation environment, where the adjustments of prices and 
thus of current and expected inflation rates are quite slow due to different mechanisms causing 
nominal rigidities in the short-run (menu costs, partial adjustments, overlapping contracts etc.). 
As the expected inflation rate cannot instantly jump to its equilibrium value, the system is 
unstable.  
The dynamic behavior of the economy described by equation (21) can be summarized in 
the following proposition. 
Proposition 3. Under the discount rate rule (14) and Friedman’s k-percent money growth rule 
(20), the expected and realized inflation rates, real output and real money stock will follow an 
unstable dynamic process of adjustment.  
Proof: The eigenvalue of the dynamic equation (21) equals  0 > Ψ .  ■  
The expected inflation rate is indeterminate under Friedman’s k-percent rule in the sense 
that it will be on a divergent trajectory whenever the system is hit by a shock (or even a 
perception error). If the expected inflation rate diverges from its equilibrium value following a 
shock, equations (17)-(18) imply that the realized inflation and output would follow similar 
divergent trajectories. It follows that the real money demand is also unstable. This observation 
is interesting since instability in money demand is notably observed when, in practice, central 
banks use interest rate policy more intensely while keeping simple monetary targeting rule.  
Hence, the monetary targeting rule specified in equation (20) might not be considered as a 
warrant against major deviations of current and expected inflation rates from the inflation 
target and thus might not reinforce the private belief about the chance of success of monetary 
authorities in implementing an interest rate policy consistent with the inflation target.    27
Under an alternative assumption according to which the expected inflation rate, as a non-
predetermined variable, can freely jump to attain its equilibrium value, the equilibrium will be 
saddle-point stable.12 However, when the system is perturbed by shocks, the jumping expected 
inflation rate can miss the target and is therefore submitted to the risk of following a non-
converging trajectory, leading to speculative inflation or deflation.  
Therefore, whatever is the nature (predetermined or non-predetermined) of expected 
inflation rate, it is better to appropriately adjust the money growth rate through an alternative 
rule to ensure that the dynamic system has a stable equilibrium.  
It is easy to understand why macroeconomic instability could arise as a result of 
implementing an optimal discount rate rule combined with a rigid money growth rule. 
Departing from an initial equilibrium, answering to an increase in inflation expectations due to 
a shock, the central bank raises the discount rate, which induces an increase in money and 
credit market interest rates, leading hence to a decrease in output (due to a higher credit market 
interest rate) as well as a decrease in real money demand (due to a higher money market 
interest rate and lower revenue). For given money growth rate determined by the central bank 
according to (20), a higher money market interest rate implies a supplementary money supply 
growth due to money-multiplier effects according to equation (4). With a reduced real money 
demand, the equilibrium condition of money market implies a higher future inflation rate that 
economic agents could easily anticipate if they attentively observe this market. Workers could 
ask higher nominal wages to compensate for the loss of purchasing power due to a higher 
future inflation. This will effectively generate further inflationary pressures.  
In effect, emerging market economies (i.e., Latin American countries during the 1980s) 
and transition economies (i.e., Eastern European countries in 1990s) provide numerous 
                                                           
12 The equilibrium is saddle-point stable if the number of unstable eigenvalues is inferior or equal to the number 
of non-predetermined variables (See Buiter, 1984).   28
examples where a sharp increase in nominal interest rate did not allow reducing expected and 
hence realized inflation rates. 
 
6. Feedback monetary targeting rules 
 
The instability result of k-percent money growth rule under inflation-targeting regime is due to 
the fact that the money growth rate determined by the central bank is given while the interest 
rate policy is tightening or relaxing to answer to different shocks. The solution to this problem 
is to fine-tune the monetary targeting rule so that it reacts to changing economic and financial 
conditions in harmony with optimal discount rate rule.  
Two feedback money growth rules will be considered in the following. A component 
destined to counterbalance the effects of observable shocks on inflation expectations can also 
be integrated in these rules. They can be implemented thanks to nonprice rationing of access to 
the central liquidity by the commercial banks, adjustment of the ratio of obligatory reserves 
and/or control of the emission of currency. To imbed the dynamic stability in the economic 
system, it is important to choose the appropriate value of the parameter characterizing the 
feedback component of these rules. 
 
6.1. Money growth varying with the rate of change in output 
The first feedback money growth rule remedying the dynamic instability due to the 
Friedman’s k-percent rule (20) is specified to react to the variation of output: 
t f
f l j j f l h h
t y y & & η η μ μ β
β β + − + =
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T π = μ .                     (22)   
This rule is similar to the one considered by Taylor (1985), McCallum (1988a, b), Judd 
and Motley (1991), Hess, Small and Brayton (1993), and Feldstein and Stock (1994). The 
monetary targeting rule (22) implies that the central bank accommodates the variation of   29
output over the current period when determining the current money growth rate. Time 
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equation (19) gives the dynamic equation for expected inflation rate:  
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Proposition 4a.  The dynamic equation (23), which is established under the discount rate rule 












2) ( . It is negative if  0
2 < Ψ − + καη κα λ , i.e.  η κα
κα λ < Ψ
+ 2
.  Under this 
condition, the expected inflation rate is determinate and converges to its equilibrium value 
following any shock.  ■ 
An increase in the expected inflation rate which is initially at its equilibrium level will 
induce higher interest rates, hence lower output and money demand but higher money supply 
and inflation. To avoid that the expected inflation rate deviates further from its equilibrium 
level, the monetary targeting rule (22), which responds to the decrease in output by 
sufficiently reducing the money growth rate, allows equilibrating the money market at lower 
and lower expected inflation rates. Consequently, escalating increases in nominal discount rate 
are unnecessary to contain higher expected inflation rates in the future.    30




min , over which η  is compatible 
with stable equilibrium, decreases with κ ,  β ,  1 f  and  2 h , and increases with λ,  1 l ,  2 l , 1 j , 
2 j ,   2 f   and  1 h . It increases with α if 
2 α κ
λ < . 
Proof. See Appendix C.  
The minimal value of η ,  η min , compatible with stable equilibrium increases with the 
weight assigned to output stabilization λ and decreases if the central bank worries more about 
the realization of the inflation target κ .  
 It also varies with other parameters reflecting the economic and financial characteristics of 
the economy. Financial developments have considerable importance when the central bank 
designs a money growth rule. Higher interest-elasticity of aggregate demand (greater β), 
higher elasticity of credit and money supply relative to the refinancing conditions (greater  1 f  
and greater  2 h ), more efficient transaction and payment system (smaller  1 l ), smaller semi-
interest elasticity of money demand (smaller  2 l ), lower revenue-elasticity of credit demand 
(smaller  1 j ), and lower interest-elasticity of credit supply (smaller  2 f ) allow the central bank 
to vary less strongly money growth (smaller  η min ) in response to the rate of change in output 
without generating macro-economic instability. A less flexible labor market (smaller α, but 
under the condition 
2 α κ
λ < ) has similar effect on  η min .  It is to notice that financial 
innovations increasing the semi-interest elasticity of money demand (greater substitution 
between money and financial assets) require the central bank to keep the money supply more 
reactive to the variation in output.  
 
6.2. Money growth reacting to the variation of inflation rate    31
The second feedback monetary targeting rule negatively links the money growth rate to 
the variation of inflation: 
t f
f l j j f l h h
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T π μ = .              (24)  
Substituting  t π &  by 
e
t π &  in equation (24) will only slightly modify the results. Introducing 
e π &  has even some advantages if indexed and non-indexed bonds are simultaneously quoted on 
financial markets since, in this case, the expected inflation rate is directly derived from 
observing the spread between interest rates, while the realised inflation rate must be calculated 
with data which may not be quickly available. Using equation (17) to obtain 
) ( 2 t
e
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+  and substituting it into equation (24) lead to:  
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The mathematical expectations of equation (25) allows determining 
e
t μ . Inserting it into 
equation (19) yields:  
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Proposition 5a. Under the discount rate rule (14) and the money growth rule (24),  the 





Proof. To demonstrate Proposition 5a, it is sufficient to show that the eigenvalue of dynamic 
equation (26) is negative when  0
2 < Ψ − + ϕλ κα λ  or equivalently  ϕ λ
κα λ < Ψ
+ 2
. Therefore, the 
dynamic system has a stable equilibrium.   ■ 
In the event of an increase in expected inflation rate due to a shock, the central bank raises 
the discount rate to increase money and credit market interest rates. The resulting decrease in 
money demand (due to a higher money market interest rate and lower revenue) and increase in   32
money supply (due to a higher money market interest rate) imply higher inflationary pressures. 
The monetary targeting rule (24) with  λ
κα λ ϕ Ψ
+ >
2
  allows sufficiently reducing the money 
growth rate in response to a higher inflation rate, hence dampening the increase in expected 
and realized inflation rates, without resorting to an excessive response in the discount rate.  




min , over which  ϕ  is compatible 
with stable equilibrium, decreases with λ, β ,  1 f  and  2 h , and increases with κ ,  1 l ,  2 l , 1 j ,  2 j , 
2 f ,   1 h  and α. 
Proof. See Appendix D.  
The threshold value of ϕ, i.e.  ϕ min ,  diminishes with the weight assigned to output 
stabilization (greater λ)  and increases with the weight assigned to inflation stabilization 
(greater  κ ), contrary to the threshold value of η , i.e.  η min . It varies also with structural 
parameters similarly to  η min  associated with the money growth rule (22), except that the 
relation between the  ϕ min  and α is not anymore submitted to a bound imposed on  κ
λ . 
The results summarized in Propositions 4a and 5a are compatible with the view of the 
modern quantitative theory of money. According to the latter, whenever there is an 
inflationary pressure, the money supply must be tightened to limit the rise of prices. The 
implications of these propositions are also compatible with the inflation-targeting framework 
in the sense that the optimal discount rate rule is designed to minimize the loss function of the 
central bank subject to the Phillips and IS curves, even though the equilibrium conditions 
relating different interest rates also have to be taken into account. However, when money and 
financial markets are imperfect in transmitting the effects of discount rate decisions to the 
economy, the design of a dynamically stabilizing ‘two-pillar’ strategy, i.e. the combination of 
inflation targeting and monetary targeting, implies that the money supply policy must not be   33
rigidified as a k-percent rule according to Proposition 3. It is shown that the money supply, 
which is partially endogenous and imperfectly elastic due to nonprice rationing of access to 
the central and inside liquidity, must be regulated by adopting well-designed feedback money 
growth rules.  
Most importantly, the principal findings of this study call into question some clichés of the 
modern quantitative theory of money as well as these of the standard stochastic inflation 
targeting framework. At one hand, under k-percent money growth rule, the resulting excess of 
liquidity due to diminishing real money demand for transaction and speculation is translated 
into vicious circle of increasing expected inflation rate, increasing nominal and real interest 
rates and diminishing real money demand. To avoid that, money growth rules given in (22) 
and (24) or their linear combination suggest to sufficiently diminish the liquidity in the 
economy when current inflation rate varies positively and current output varies negatively. On 
the other hand, in order to curb an increase in the inflation rate, inflation targeting implies an 
increase in the nominal interest rate to sufficiently raise the real interest rate. But this is not 
sufficient to ensure the dynamic stability of the economy when the central bank, under the 
funds rate targeting procedure, has only indirect control of market interest rates and private 
agents use all information, including that extracted from money and financial markets, to form 




In this paper, using a model which incorporates imperfect money, credit and reserves markets, 
we reconsider the monetary policy strategy of an inflation-targeting central bank operating 
under the funds rate targeting procedure. It is argued that, when money and financial markets 
imperfectly transmit the effects of interest rate policy to the economy, the cheap talk of central   34
bankers may not be sufficient to ensure the announced inflation target as credible nominal 
anchor of private inflation expectations and inflation-targeting central banks have good 
reasons to use monetary targeting together with inflation targeting. Using as communication 
and anchoring device, well-conceived monetary targeting with a commitment to a long-run 
money growth rate consistent with the inflation target, as part of a hybrid inflation-targeting 
regime similar to the ECB’s two-pillar monetary policy strategy, could effectively reinforce 
the credibility of the central bank and the role of the inflation target as strong and credible 
nominal anchor for inflation expectations.  
It is shown that the narrow monetary aggregate, i.e. a component of monetary base, should 
be regulated with a rule but not in the way conceived by Milton Friedman. The inflation-
targeting regime associated with Friedman’s simple k-percent money growth rule can generate 
macro-economic instability. In effect, to ensure the macroeconomic stability, the money 
growth rate must be flexibly adjusted to answer directly or/and indirectly to shocks affecting 
inflation adjustment, aggregate spending, and money and financial markets. It is important that 
feedback money growth rules are designed to sufficiently diminish the liquidity in the 
economy when current inflation rate varies positively or/and current output varies negatively. 
Moreover, the design of these rules implies a careful account of the structural parameters of 
the economy as well as the preferences of the central bank.  
 
Appendix A: The money supply under the funds rate targeting procedure 
The monetary base  t MB is decomposed as the sum of the total reserve  t TR and currency  t C , 
the latter is assumed to be exogenously fixed by the central bank. Expressing this relationship 
in log terms yields: 










ψ ψχ − + ≡ + = ≡ ,      (A.1)   35
where  t t TR log ≡ χ ,  t t C c log ≡ ,  *
*
MB
TR ≡ ψ , and the superscript asterisk designs the steady state.  
To establish the link between the  t b  and the discount rate, we use a simplified description 
of the reserve market. The central bank is assumed to use a funds rate targeting procedure, 
under which it controls the discount rate  dt i  and conducts open market operations to affect the 
supply of reserves in the banking system to target the funds rate,  ft i , the interest rate banks in 
need of reserves pay to borrow from banks with surplus reserves. Thus, total reserves and 
hence the monetary base  t b  will depend on  dt i .  
Reserve demand arises primarily from the requirement that banks hold reserves equal to a 
specified fraction of their deposit liability and is assumed to be a negative function of  dt i . 
Other factors such as aggregate income and prices are simply treated as part of the error term, 
d






t i TR ν φ χ + − = ≡ log .                      (A.2) 
The total supply of reserves held by banking system can be expressed as the sum of the 
reserves that banks have borrowed from the central bank ( t BR ) plus nonborrowed reserves 
( t NBR ), i.e.  t t
s






















BR ≡ γ ,  t
b
t BR log ≡ χ  and  t
nb
t NBR log ≡ χ . 
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t i i ν ζ χ + − = ) (,    0 > ζ ,                   (A.5) 
The parameter ζ  specifies how a variation in  ft i  affects reserve borrowings. It depends on 
how such a variation affects expectations of future funds rate levels which are not modelled 
here. Non-price rationing of access to the central liquidity implies that  dt ft i i ≠ . The shock 
b
t ν  
stands for other factors which affect reserve borrowings. 
Under the funds rate targeting procedure, the effects on  ft i  of shocks affecting the reserve 
demand and the borrowed reserves are entirely compensated by the central bank. Hence, the 
funds rate is determined by the discount rate. Nevertheless, the funds rate targeting is 
imperfect and is subject to a monetary policy shock 
s





















.                     (A.6) 
Using equations (A.2)-(A.3) and (A.5)-(A.6), the equilibrium condition on the reserve 
market (A.4) is rewritten as: 
s
t dt ft ft i i i ν γ γζ φ ) 1 ( ) ( − + − = − .           ( A . 7 )  
Solving equations (A.2) and (A.7) for 
f
t i  and  t χ in terms of 
d
t i  and shocks gives: 
s



























.         ( A . 9 )  
                                                           
13 The specification of functions  t BR  and  t NBR  follows Walsh (2003). They are rewritten in logs terms here. In 
more elaborated reserve market model, the total supply of reserves could also depend on future interest rates 
(Walsh, 1982; Goodfriends, 1983).  
14 For the implications of other operating procedures and a brief history of operating procedures used by the Fed 
and some other central banks, see Walsh (2003, pages 451-71).  
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Substituting  t χ given by equation (A.9) into equation (A.1) and assuming that  c ct =  (i.e. 
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Define  c bt ) 1 ( ψ − ≡ ,  ζγ φ
φζγψ




t mt ω ψν ν ε ζγ φ
γ φψ + + ≡ +
− ) 1 ( . This leads to equation (5). 
 
Appendix B: Dynamics of the expected inflation rate (
e π & ) 
At the end of a period, private agents revise their inflation expectations for the future using all 
information about the economy, including that extracted from the equilibrium conditions on 
the money and financial markets. Assume that  0 =
T π &  and denote  t t b μ ≡ & . Time derivation of 
equations (16) and (17) and leads to: 
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Substituting  t π &  given by equations (B.2) into (B.1) yields: 
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The mathematical expectations of equation (B.3) imply: 
  ). ( ) ( )   (          







1 1 2 1 2 2 2 1
2 1
2 2 1 2 2
1 1



















f l j j f l h h e
t h f
l h h j f e
mt y
ε ε ε ε π μ






& & & &
& & & & &
− − − − − −




+ + + + − + − +
        (B.4)   38
Rearranging the terms in (B.4) yields the dynamic equation for expected inflation rate.    ■ 
 
Appendix C: Proof of Proposition 4b 
Using the definition of Ψ , we write 
1
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+ + + + + + + − ≡ . To 
show Proposition 4b, we derive  η min  with respect to different parameters as follows: 
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Appendix D: Proof of Proposition 5b   39
To show Proposition 5b, we derive  λ β
β κα β κα κα λ β ϕ
1
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min , it follows that 
η ϕ λ
κα min min = . Thus, the derivatives of  ϕ min  with respect to β ,  1 l ,  2 l ,  1 h ,  2 h ,  1 j ,  2 j ,  1 f  
and  2 f  can be easily obtained from multiplying by  λ
κα  the corresponding ones of  η min . It is 
hence straightforward to obtain their sign. Thus, we only give the following derivates:  
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